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In reviewing a recent book of Max Corden on the choice of an exchange rate regime 
(Corden 2002), I was struck by the fact that it largely ignored what I have long regarded 
as a central issue so far as developing countries are concerned. The same might be said of 
most writing on the topic, from the IMF to Joe Stiglitz. The present chapter attempts to 
remedy this oversight, by exploring what I shall term the “Development Strategy 
Approach” to the choice of an exchange-rate regime. The most prominent exponent of 
this strand of thought was Bela Balassa. 
 
 The next section of the chapter lays out the three approaches that are recognized 
by orthodox thought, using Max Corden’s book as a basis. This is followed by an 
exposition of the simple theory of the Development Strategy Approach. There is then a 
discussion of the extent to which it is possible to use the Development Strategy Approach 
in a world of capital mobility. Finally, since the threat of international incompatibility of 
payments objectives arises in a world where it is indeed possible to use the approach and 
many countries choose to do so, there is a discussion of how any such incompatibility 





Max Corden describes three alternative “approaches” to the choice of exchange rate 
regime. These are essentially the analytical frameworks that are invoked by those who 
believe that exchange rate policy needs to take account of specific ends. The “Nominal 
Anchor” approach is used by those who believe that exchange rate policy needs to take 
account of the role of the exchange rate in pinning down the price level. The “Real 
Targets” approach is employed by those who recognize that the exchange rate plays a key 
role in determining macroeconomic equilibrium. They used to see the exchange rate as a 
policy lever that should be manipulated to achieve macroeconomic equilibrium, and 
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nowadays believe that the exchange rate regime should be chosen with a view to 
facilitating the achievement of targets for the real economy. The “Exchange Rate 
Stability” approach is the framework of those who regard exchange rate instability as 
posing a major problem. 
 
 The Nominal Anchor approach originated in global monetarist writing, 
particularly that of Robert Mundell (1968, 1971). The theory says that there is a unique 
structure of relative prices; fix any one price and introduce a negative feedback 
mechanism such that the price level will tend to increase (decline) whenever there are 
pressures for that price to decline (increase), and the one fixed price will pin down the 
price level. Specifically, fix the exchange rate and make sure (à la David Hume) that a 
balance of payments deficit (surplus) leads to a fall (increase) in the money supply, and 
the price level will be pinned down by the exchange rate commitment. The theory has 
been applied by a number of countries, primarily in Latin America, that have tried to stop 
an ongoing high inflation by an exchange rate commitment. As early as the Southern 
Cone experiments of the late 1970s, it became clear that this strategy can indeed succeed 
in stopping a high inflation, but that it does so only after the price level has overshot so 
that the currency has become overvalued, which threatens the sustainability of the 
commitment to a fixed exchange rate. A “tablita” or “active crawling peg”—commitment 
to a pre-announced path for the exchange rate involving a progressive decrease in the rate 
of devaluation, rather than immediate adoption of a fixed exchange rate—has been used 
in an attempt to circumvent the problem of overshooting, but without notable success. It 
seems clear that the underlying theory that claims that there is a unique equilibrium 
structure of relative prices is incorrect; rather, it needs an overvalued exchange rate to 
offset inherited inflationary inertia and generate price stability. To move from there to 
full macroeconomic equilibrium, involving an equilibrium exchange rate as well as low 
inflation, requires a period of price deflation, which is at best politically difficult to 
sustain and is at worst a recipe for economic implosion (e.g. Japan). 
 
 The Real Targets Approach is familiar to most economists. It stems (like so much 
of modern macroeconomics, even today) from the work of Keynes. James Meade (1951) 
formalized it, using Tinbergen’s analysis of the need for at least as many independent 
instruments of economic policy as there are targets. The Swan diagram (Swan 1960) gave 
it a familiar diagrammatic form. In its original version it posited that the two independent 
instruments of macroeconomic policy were fiscal-monetary policy and exchange-rate 
policy, and demonstrated the need for the exchange rate to be set at an appropriate level if 
the two objectives of internal and external balance were to be achieved simultaneously. 
Mundell’s analysis of the fiscal-monetary mix (Mundell 1968, ch.16) treated fiscal and 
monetary policy as separate instruments and argued that they would have different effects 
because monetary policy would influence capital flows as well as the current account, 
thus allowing the two targets to be hit with a fixed exchange rate. The flaw in the 
argument is that use of the Mundellian mix is dynamically unstable in the medium term 
(Williamson 1971), because an excessive current account deficit has to be offset by a 
capital inflow induced by high interest rates that (together with the increasing debt) 
magnify interest payments and thus the current account deficit and hence require yet 
higher interest rates. The solution seen by most exponents of the Real Targets Approach 
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is exchange-rate flexibility: letting the exchange rate float reduces the number of targets 
to one, since the floating exchange rate equilibrates the balance of payments without any 
need for a conscious policy, and thus allows fiscal and monetary policy to be directed to 
internal balance. Alternatively, it is nowadays more common to argue that monetary 
policy should be directed at the short-run objective of internal balance (often interpreted 
as inflation targeting) while fiscal policy is guided by medium-run solvency objectives. 
The bottom line is that policy should not be concerned with balance of payments 
objectives, including the structure of the balance of payments (notably the size of the 
current account deficit). 
 
 The Exchange Rate Stability Approach does not have the same academic pedigree 
as either the Nominal Anchor Approach or the Real Targets Approach. It is, rather, Max 
Corden’s attempt to make theoretical sense of the reasoning that lay behind the European 
Monetary System. He notes the instability that characterizes floating rates, and the 
difficulty of rationalizing many exchange rate movements in terms of changes in the 
fundamentals. He is agnostic about whether this instability is particularly harmful, but 
acknowledges that some people firmly believe that it is. He points out that monetary 
policy is technically capable of moderating exchange rate instability, but notes that this 
may result in movements in the interest rate that could be counterproductive from the 
standpoint of stabilization of the domestic economy. He argues that the core of truth in 
this approach arises in the case “where the exchange rate fluctuates purely because of 
fluctuations in market expectations about the future exchange rate… If these fluctuating 
expectations are taken as given, then an attempt to fix the exchange rate would simply 
convert exchange rate instability into interest rate instability… On the other hand, a 
decision to fix the exchange rate permanently and credibly…would stabilize the 
expectations themselves and thus yield a net stability gain.” (Corden 2002, p.31.) Of 
course, he also points out that if the pressure for the exchange rate to change comes from 
variations in underlying real factors, then stabilization of the exchange rate would come 
at the cost of increased instability in the real economy (for reasons explained by the Real 
Targets Approach).  
 
 Probably the most common reaction of economists is to argue that one set of 
factors outweighs the others and then plump for the exchange rate regime suggested by 
the approach judged to be most important in the particular country in question. Nowadays 
this is most commonly the Real Targets Approach, and the majority of economists 
(conspicuously including those at the IMF, although this was not obviously true even a 
few years ago) therefore favor floating rates, at least for most of the larger economies. 
Some economists accept that there is an element of truth in all three approaches. My own 
reaction falls in this category and therefore involved trying to design a regime that would 
allow a country to secure the benefits of each of the approaches (though I admit that I had 
not thought of it in quite this way before reading Corden’s book). Thus the BBC (basket, 
band, and crawl) regime seeks to avoid adjustment in response to what need not be 
shocks (movements among third currencies, which are neutralized at the macro level by 
the basket, and relative inflation, which can be neutralized by the crawl) and to secure 
adjustment in response to shocks that cannot be neutralized (terms of trade changes, 
changes in underlying capital flows) by small changes in the parity, as suggested by the 
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Real Targets Approach. Following the Nominal Anchor Approach, one can also build in 
a programmed deceleration of inflation by pre-announcing a conditional path for the 
crawl. The band seeks to avoid the random fluctuations in expectations emphasized by 
the Exchange Rate Stability Approach. A BBC regime requires that the authorities are 
capable of distinguishing the real shocks that should lead to changes in the parity from 
the expectational froth that the Exchange Rate Stability Approach seeks to eliminate.2 It 
also requires that the regime carry credibility, which is an asset that the authorities have 
irresponsibly squandered over the years. 
 
 
The Development Strategy Approach 
 
However, the purpose of this chapter is not to rehearse the advantages of a BBC regime, 
but to explore an alternative approach that is not acknowledged by Max Corden3 or others 
who view the problem in the currently orthodox way, like the IMF and Joe Stiglitz. This 
alternative is most prominent in the writings of Bela Balassa.4 
 
 Balassa believed that exchange rate policy was one of the keys for a country’s 
development. If it had an exchange rate sufficiently competitive to motivate its 
entrepreneurs to go and sell things other than traditional export commodities on the world 
market (what he described as a “realistic” exchange rate), they would also want to invest 
and expand employment and the economy would grow. At the other extreme, if it got too 
much easy money from oil exports, or aid, or capital inflows, then its exchange rate 
would be driven to a point where there is no money to be made from non-traditional 
exports. It will be more profitable to squabble about getting a share of the rents than to 
invest, produce, and contribute to the economy’s growth. The country will suffer from 
Dutch disease.  
 
 Since Balassa’s day empirical evidence has been presented which suggests that 
growth, and therefore the standard of living if one takes a sufficiently long-run 
perspective, is inversely correlated with resource endowments (Sachs and Warner 1995). 
This result appears highly counter-intuitive from the standpoint of traditional theory, but 
it provides striking evidence that Balassa was right and that Dutch disease is dangerous, 
not simply a “part of the inevitable relative price adjustment process that goes with a 
favorable shock” (Corden 2002, p.102). The fact is that Venezuela is the only country in 
                                                 
2   The rhetorical question usually posed by critics is “Why should the authorities be better able to make 
this distinction than the market?” The response is that they may not be in a better position to answer the 
question, but that they certainly have more reason to ask it. 
3   Max Corden points out to me that he has in fact acknowledged that some economists believe in the 
importance of preserving the competitiveness of the tradable goods industries, which he has labeled 
“exchange rate protection”.  It seems to me that the very term is designed to deny the legitimacy of these 
considerations, whereas I regard the Development Strategy Approach as perfectly legitimate and worthy of 
a place on a par with Corden’s other three approaches (which may also suggest conflicting policy 
prescriptions, just as the Development Strategy Approach sometimes does). 
4   See, for example, Balassa (1982, ch.4), where he writes of applying optimal export taxes on 
commodities facing less than infinitely elastic demand and how “…a partially compensated devaluation 
would allow subsidies to be provided to nontraditional exports indirectly, through a more favorable 
exchange rate…” (p.77), or Balassa (1993, ch.1). 
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South America where living standards are lower today than they were a half-century ago; 
is this despite, or because, it has the richest endowment of natural resources in the 
continent? Of course, oil resources can be well managed, as they were in Suharto’s 
Indonesia, which devalued in 1978 despite the absence of any balance of payments need 
(and, because of this, in the teeth of opposition from the IMF) in order to maintain the 
competitiveness of its other exports. The point is that there is at least some evidence to 
believe that maintaining growth in the presence of rich natural resource exports requires a 
willingness to do whatever it takes to maintain an exchange rate sufficiently competitive 
to promote non-traditional exports. 
 
 A recent paper of Dani Rodrik (2003) argues that growth spurts happen when a 
critical mass of entrepreneurs decides that a country is a good place to invest. What 
creates that conviction? He argues that the causes are often idiosyncratic, which seems 
plausible enough. When it comes to trying to identify more general causes, he suggests 
only one candidate: a competitive exchange rate. 
 
 Should one conclude that the more competitive the exchange rate, the better are 
growth prospects? That would be silly; growth needs a supply of savings in order to 
translate investment intentions into actual investment, and a more competitive exchange 
rate implies a more positive current account and thus a lower supply of savings to finance 
investment. Growth will be maximized, in the simplest model, where these two effects 
balance one another. That simplest model may be written: 
 
g = g(I) = h(e), g’ (the inverse of the ICOR) > 0, h’ > 0 
 
where g is growth (of supply-side potential), I is desired investment as a fraction of GDP, 
and e is the exchange rate (units of domestic currency per dollar). The h(e) function 
represents the effect of a more competitive exchange rate in inducing more exports and 
thus greater investment intentions. However, investment is constrained by savings: 
 
I ≤ S 
 
where S is savings as a fraction of GDP. Savings consist of domestic savings plus the 
current account deficit: 
 
S = D + CAD = D + c(e), c’ < 0 
 
where D is domestic savings as a fraction of GDP ( assumed constant for simplicity) and 
CAD is the current account deficit as a fraction of GDP, which is a negative function of 
the exchange rate. 
 
 The solution of this model in the case where the exchange rate is a policy variable 
can be presented in terms of a simple diagram, Figure 1. Following a longstanding 
tradition of economists that runs counter to the conventions of all other sciences, I depict 
savings and investment on the horizontal axis and the exchange rate on the vertical axis 
despite the fact that we are hypothesizing that savings and investment depend on the 
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exchange rate rather than vice versa. The second part of equation (1) is shown by the I-
function: a more competitive exchange rate results in more investment. Equation (3) is 
shown by the S-function: savings increase as the current account deficit increases because 
of a less competitive exchange rate. Inequality (2) tells us that we must be on the left-
hand side of the S-function. Growth is maximized where I is maximized, which is at (e*, 
I*), where the I and S functions intersect.  The growth-maximizing exchange rate is e*. 
 
 Suppose the government chooses an exchange rate less than e* (the currency is 
stronger, as that term was commonly understood prior to Treasury Secretary John Snow’s 
redefinition of the meaning of a strong currency). This means that there will be a 
reluctance to invest that will either depress income or will require some action such as an 
expansionary fiscal policy that will push the S-function leftwards to S’. That might 
restore full employment, but I would still be lower unless the increase in public spending 
all took the form of investment, and g would therefore still be lower, unless the shortfall 
in investment were completely made up and the return on the public investment matched 
that on the private investment that was crowded out by the strong exchange rate.  
 
 Suppose the government chooses an exchange rate greater than e* (i.e. a more 
depreciated currency). Entrepreneurs would get excited by export prospects and like to 
invest more. However, investment would be constrained by a lack of savings; unless the 
government were also to adopt a tighter fiscal policy or the central bank were to tighten 
monetary policy, investment would be squeezed out by the lack of savings created by an 
increased current account surplus. Growth would again be lower. 
 
 There will be some particular point on the S-curve that is associated with current 
account balance. If this is to the N.W. of (e*, I*), then choice of the growth-maximizing 
exchange rate will imply a current account deficit. If that deficit is of a size that can be 
financed by capital inflows without drawing on the reserves, then it is (at least in the 
short run) sustainable. If instead it can be financed only by drawing down the reserves, 
then sooner or later a traditional IMF-style adjustment package will be needed, involving 
devaluation and restrictive fiscal-monetary policies. In this situation an increased capital 
inflow that avoided the need for such a package would be good for growth: the capital 
inflow would finance a continued high level of investment. 
 
 Conversely, consider the case in which current account balance lies to the S.E. of 
(e*, I*) on the S-curve. Then continued maintenance of the growth-maximizing exchange 
rate would require either continued accumulation of reserves or a capital account outflow. 
An increase in net capital inflows would make it harder to keep the exchange rate at e*, 
since it would require the central bank to acquire and sterilize reserves faster. 
 
 Now suppose that the government resolves to let the exchange rate float 
“cleanly”. This means that the exchange rate will be determined by the S-curve at the 
point where the current account balance is equal to the capital flow. If the latter is 
exogenous, then the exchange rate will be determined straightforwardly by the balance of 
payments condition. It would be a matter of luck if the exchange rate were to be the 
growth-maximizing rate. If instead capital inflows were too large, e would be less than 
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e*; this would be a position of full employment only if the fiscal deficit were equal to the 
distance between the S and I curves. (Fiscal consolidation without a change in the capital 
inflow would lead to unemployment, rather than a weaker currency.) If capital inflows 
were too small, then the currency would be weak and the government would be forced to 
adopt deflationary fiscal-monetary policies to avoid inflationary pressures. 
 
 The argument up to now has essentially assumed that all goods are tradable, so 
that a more competitive exchange rate will necessarily increase the desire to invest. Once 
one acknowledges the existence of non-tradables, then it becomes necessary to ask 
whether the assumption of h1 > 0 is still reasonable. After all, a (real) appreciation will 
not only depress the relative price of tradables and thus discourage investment in them, 
but will also raise the relative price of non-tradables, which should stimulate investment 
in that sector. There are, however, two reasons for expecting that the net impact of 
appreciation will still be unfavorable to investment. One arises from the fact that much of 
the demand for non-tradables is a derived demand, derived from the demand for 
tradables. this would surely be true of, say, the demand for trucking services, or indeed 
for most other business services. The other is that the relative sizes of the markets for 
tradables and non-tradables are vastly different: the former is the world market, the latter 
the national market. Of course it would be desirable to have empirical evidence that bears 
on the point, but a priori it seems reasonable to hypothesize that the net direct impact of 
appreciation on investment will be negative.  
 
 The more interesting and complicated analytical case is that in which the capital 
flow is endogenous. The traditional hypothesis is that capital flows depend on the interest 
rate. Does this provide any reason for expecting that the exchange rate will gravitate to 
e*? In the case of large capital inflows, the interest rate would be pushed down, which 
would reduce domestic saving and hence push the S-function leftward (see S’ in Figure 
1). With the I-function as in (1), where investment is dependent on nothing but the 
exchange rate, equilibrium would obviously be restored only at a lower level of 
investment and thus growth. But consider a more general model in which investment 
depends on both the exchange rate and the interest rate: 
 
(4) g(I) = h(e,i) with h1 > 0, h2 < 0, where i is the rate of interest. 
 
Then a large capital inflow could result not merely in a leftward shift in the S-function as 
considered up to now, but also a rightward shift in the I-function. Is it possible that a 
larger capital inflow could actually result in a higher level of investment than in the initial 
situation? 
 
 Interest elasticity of the investment function could arise from two distinct sources. 
One is that a lower interest rate makes it economic to use more capital-intensive methods 
in order to produce tradables. The other is that it raises the profitability of investing in 
non-tradables. The consumption of some non-tradables is, as noted above, a derived 
demand. But this clearly does not hold for all non-tradables, e.g. it would not be a 
plausible assumption for the consumption of housing. It is because of the existence of 
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such non-tradables that it seems plausible to postulate a reasonably high interest-elasticity 
of investment in non-tradables.  
 
 This leads to the possibility that a larger capital inflow will increase investment, 
and therefore growth. But the interesting point is that one cannot guarantee this outcome. 
A larger capital inflow that depresses interest rates will increase consumption as well as 
investment. And even if there is a net increase in investment, much of it is likely to be in 
non-tradables. At times that will be appropriate, but at other times it will raise questions 
about the sustainability of the strategy: decreased investment in tradables at the same 
time as an increase in foreign borrowing raises the need to be able to service foreign debt 
has been a familiar prelude to the crises that have devastated growth in many emerging 
markets in recent years. 
 
 The model developed here is in a key sense Keynesian rather than neoclassical. 
Specifically, it postulates that investment is determined (subject to a savings constraint) 
by the desire to invest, rather than that all desired savings get translated into investment 
as neoclassical growth theory hypothesizes. This explains the very different policy 
conclusion yielded by this model as opposed to that used by, say, Lal, Bery and Pant 
(2003). In their model, the decision of the Indian authorities in recent years to accumulate 
and sterilize reserves necessarily had a cost in terms of lower investment and growth. The 
model developed above is agnostic on this point: it recognizes the possibility that keeping 
a more competitive value of the rupee may have been of more value in preserving the 
desire to invest than the availability of additional savings would have been in increasing 
the ability to invest. 
 
 
Capital Mobility and the Development Strategy Approach 
 
For many years now economists have taken it for granted that exchange rates are 
determined in the asset market, and that the current account largely reacts to the exchange 
rate as was hypothesized in constructing Figure 1. There seems no particular reason to 
postulate that the exchange rate thus selected will bear any particular relationship to the 
growth-maximizing exchange rate e*. Indeed, there have been cases where it seems clear 
that the exchange rate was stronger than this criterion would suggest: this was, for 
example,  the motivation for the Chilean encaje, and there were a number of other 
countries that suffered from a similar problem of excessive capital inflows in the first half 
of the 1990s (though most did nothing much about it). 
 
 What policy weapons are available to prevent an exchange rate becoming 
uncompetitive in this situation? The first thing to ask is whether there is scope for 
liberalizing current account transactions. This was the principal policy tool used to 
achieve balance of payments adjustment in European countries in the earlier postwar 
years: when a country had a payments surplus, it would take the next measures to 
liberalize trade or invisible transactions. Nowadays fewer countries have a backlog of 
restrictions that they are searching for the opportunity of dismantling, but it nonetheless 
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makes sense to start by asking whether there may be opportunities to kill two birds with 
one stone. 
 
The most familiar policy weapon, which is the usual first line of resort, is sterilized 
intervention in the foreign exchange market. The government can buy foreign exchange 
and add it to the reserves, while sterilizing to prevent any undesired monetary impact. 
The problem with this policy is that it may be costly. If the domestic interest rate that the 
central bank will have to pay (or will not earn) on the domestic assets that it sells exceeds 
the foreign interest rate (corrected for expected changes in the exchange rate) that it earns 
on the reserves that it buys, then the central bank will lose money on the operation. The 
sums involved are not necessarily de minimis. Both Chile and Colombia were at one 
stage in the 1990s spending more than 0.5 percent of GDP in sterilizing the reserves that 
they had accumulated in an attempt to keep a sufficiently competitive exchange rate to 
avoid destroying their non-traditional export industries. 
 
 An alternative way of achieving de facto sterilization without issuing additional 
bonds is to require government-controlled financial institutions (such as the postal 
savings system) to switch their deposits from commercial banks to the central bank. This 
proved effective in some Asian countries (Fischer and Reisen 1992), but it implies either 
reducing the return to savers in those institutions or else it once again imposes a cost on 
the central bank. 
 
 If the central bank is losing money in sterilizing its reserve acquisitions, then one 
possible way out of the box is to reduce the domestic interest rate that it pays on the 
liabilities it issues in order to sterilize the purchase of reserves. (Another way of saying 
this is that it can cease to sterilize all its intervention.) The problem with this solution is 
that it may be inflationary, at least unless the monetary expansion is offset by a more 
restrictive fiscal policy. It is easy for economists to recommend such offsetting action, 
but tough for politicians to implement it: “Mr. President, I need to raise taxes and cut 
expenditures because the foreigners are trying to lend us so much money” is bound to be 
a hard sell. 
 
 Some countries may have the opportunity of sterilizing by altering the currency 
composition of their borrowing. If they have previously borrowed in foreign currency, 
they can switch their borrowing to domestic currency. Of course, this too will have a 
fiscal cost, to the extent that it is necessary to pay more to borrow in local currency (after 
adjusting for the expected change in the exchange rate). Given the lesser risk to which 
countries are exposed through domestic currency borrowing, however, it makes sense to 
exploit this channel unless the cost differential is massive. Countries with a large volume 
of foreign currency debt may have a great deal of scope to manage their exchange rates in 
this way. (Brazil is currently a good case in point.) 
 
 Exchange rate policy may also be able to play a role, at least where it has not lost 
all credibility by virtue of a history of unconvincing and ultimately unenforceable 
promises. A credible announcement that the exchange rate will be maintained within a 
band will give the market an incentive to limit the deviation of the rate from its parity, as 
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was shown in a classic article of Paul Krugman (1991), while preserving the incentive of 
the tradable goods industries to maintain investment, insofar as they regard the parity 
rather than the current market rate as offering better guidance of the long-run rate.  
 
 The other major instrument that can be deployed to manage an exchange rate is 
capital controls. These come in multiple varieties, many of which are extremely 
distasteful (e.g. because they impinge on personal freedom). But there are particular 
forms that are less problematic than others.  
 
To begin with, prudential regulations on the banking system will have some of the same 
effects as capital controls. It is sensible to limit the open position that banks can take. If 
they are allowed to extend foreign currency loans to the non-tradable sector at all, they 
should be required to recognize that this practice involves risks, and obliged to insure 
those risks (see Rojas-Suarez in Kuczynski and Williamson 2003).  
 
A rather attractive form of “control” is the encaje as practiced in Chile during the 1990s. 
This consisted of a requirement that a certain percentage of a non-equity capital inflow 
(30 percent for most of the period) had to be placed in a non-interest bearing account at 
the central bank for a year, irrespective of the term of the asset being purchased with the 
inflow. The intention was to provide much more of a disincentive for short-term capital 
inflows than for longer-term inflows, since the sum to be deposited and the required 
length of the deposit (and thus the extent of sacrificed interest income) were invariant to 
the term of the asset being purchased. There has been a lively literature about the 
effectiveness of the encaje, with a number of economists (e.g. Sebastian Edwards 1999) 
acknowledging that it was effective in changing the maturity of inflows but denying that 
it had any significant impact on the total size of the inflow. It seems difficult to explain 
why so many operators in the financial markets remained so hostile to the encaje if it 
were in fact so ineffective. One should also note that if the encaje in fact raised 
substantial revenue (a total of 0.9 percent of a year’s GDP over its 7-year lifetime, 
according to a personal communication from Ricardo Ffrench-Davis) without influencing 
the size of the inflow then taxation theory would imply that it constituted an ideal 
(because “distortion”-free) form of taxation!  
 
An alternative to the encaje would be to levy a tax on all receipts of foreign exchange. 
All financial institutions could be required to levy such a tax on a withholding basis, and 
it could then be refunded on transactions that it was not desired to penalize. For example, 
payments for exports could be refunded through the value-added tax system, while 
payments for receipts of income or FDI could be refunded through the income tax 
system. The result would be that only those transactions that policy was aiming to 
discourage, such as inflows of portfolio capital, would end up bearing the tax. Howell 
Zee (1999) argues that such a system would be more resistant to evasion than the Chilean 
encaje. 
 
Another alternative to the encaje is to vary the reserve ratio required of the commercial 
banks. Any company borrowing abroad will place its cash in the banking system (unless 
it uses it directly to buy imports), and so a higher required reserve ratio will have a 
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similar effect to an encaje in limiting monetary expansion. It will also increase the 
differential between the interest rate charged to domestic borrowers from the banks and 
the international interest rate, thus diminishing the incentive for further capital inflows 
intermediated through the banks. The problem is that high reserve ratios also impose 
costs. They diminish the efficiency of the financial system as borrowers are diverted 
away from those lenders subject to the high reserve requirement toward other lenders that 
escape that requirement, thus threatening disintermediation. 
 
Another option may be to liberalize capital outflows. Admittedly, there is some reason to 
fear that a blanket relaxation of capital outflows could have the perverse effect of 
stimulating net inflows (Labán and Larraín 1997; Bartolini and Drazen 1997). The reason 
is that one of the deterrents to putting money in a country is the fear that it may be 
difficult to withdraw it again, and so relieving that fear may stimulate an inflow. But 
there may be scope for limited liberalization of outflows, such as of FDI or foreign 
investment by domestic pension funds, where this is not a serious consideration. 
 
And, of course, there may be scope to discourage capital inflows by withdrawing 
measures that deliberately or inadvertently subsidize foreign investment, such as 
insurance of bank deposits held by foreigners and tax holidays to direct investors.  
 
None of these measures promise the ability to manage the exchange rate in the direct way 
possible before the days of capital mobility, under the adjustable peg of Bretton Woods 
days. But there are enough options here to suggest that a government that recognizes the 
importance of maintaining a competitive exchange rate will not be condemned to stand 
idly by and watch the exchange rate bid up to levels that threaten the continued prosperity 
of its tradable-goods industries. It makes sense for such a government to think of setting a 





If all governments decide to set targets for their exchange rates, then an issue of 
international consistency arises, since there are only (n-1) degrees of freedom to set the 
exchange rate targets of the n currencies in the world. How should this be dealt with? 
 
 One option is to allow/expect one large country to forego a target and accept its 
exchange rate passively as the outcome of the sum of decisions made elsewhere. In 
practice it has long been assumed by the advocates of this solution (such as Ronald 
McKinnon) that it is the United States that should accept this nth currency role, as the 
complement to the reserve role of the dollar. That is indeed the way the world has worked 
in recent years, but the growth of concern about the exploding US negative net 
international investment position raises questions about whether it will be feasible much 
longer. 
 
 An alternative that I was involved in promoting in the 1980s is to seek 
international agreement on a set of current account targets, which would then be 
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translated into an agreed set of exchange rate targets through an appropriate multilateral 
exchange rate model (Williamson and Miller 1987). This would have covered the G-5 or 
the G-7, with the implication that other countries would have been free to set their targets 
at will. The implicit assumption here is that other countries are collectively not large 
enough to have a significant impact on the targets that would be selected by the major 
countries. That may have been a reasonable assumption in the 1980s, when the G-7 
probably5 accounted for something over 50% of GWP (on a PPP basis), but begins to 
look less plausible as the G-7 share of GWP declines toward 40%. 
 
 A variant on that would be to have the major countries all float without targets 
according to the current orthodoxy, while smaller countries were entitled to adopt the 
Development Strategy Approach to exchange rate management, and set an exchange rate 
target that they calculate will maximize their growth. But it might be more logical to 
expect rich countries to forego an exchange-rate target, while developing countries had 
the right to set such targets. Developing countries would be defined as countries below a 
certain per capita income: $15,000 per year would seem a natural benchmark for this 
purpose, inasmuch as happiness analysis6 seems to have reached the reasonably robust 
finding that higher per capita income than this is irrelevant to collective welfare (Layard 
2003). 
 
 One possible obstacle to this approach concerns China. Among those in 
Washington who worry about the US balance of payments deficit, concern is building 
that China is thwarting the adjustment process. While most currencies have appreciated 
against the dollar since the start of 2002, China has chosen to ride the dollar down, 
despite the fact that it has a current account surplus as well as a large capital inflow, 
resulting in massive reserve accumulation. Would exemption of China from an obligation 
not to target the exchange rate, as is implied by the previous paragraph, be acceptable in 
Washington? The answer is not clear at the moment; pressure on China to appreciate has 
been growing rapidly. My own view is that China’s best interest would be served by 
appreciating the renminbi, so as to enable it to make use of more real resources to 
augment investment. In other words, I believe that China is currently above (e*, I*) in 
Figure 1: it is the availability of savings, not the incentive to invest, that is the binding 
constraint on faster growth. But adopting the principle that low-income countries should 
be unconstrained by international obligations in setting their exchange rates would 






                                                 
5   “Probably” because at that time the IMF did not aggregate global output statistics according to a PPP 
criterion, but converted national output levels according to market exchange rates. 
6   Happiness analysis has been largely pioneered by psychologists, but its implications for economics are 
explored by Richard Layard in his Robbins Lectures. He defines happiness as “feeling good—enjoying life 
and feeling it is wonderful” (p.4). 
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 I have argued that developing countries would be ill advised to allow the current 
enthusiasm for floating exchange rates to lead them into a policy of abandoning any 
attempt to target the real exchange rate. They may sensibly avoid naming any particular 
exchange rate that they will commit themselves ex ante to defend, but that does not mean 
that they should shrug their shoulders with the passivity of a non-Japanese G-7 Finance 
Minister when the markets threaten to devastate their nascent non-traditional export 
industries. There exist a variety of policy instruments that may help to limit a real 
appreciation that threatens to get out of hand. None of these is sufficiently powerful to be 
treated as justifying a return to the world of Tinbergen, but collectively they give 
countries enough traction to make it sensible to think of targeting the exchange rate. And 
countries that want to develop need to target their exchange rates so as to avoid 
overvaluation. 
 
 In arguing this, I am not intending to suggest that the Development Strategy 
Approach deserves to become the unique basis for setting exchange rate policy or 
choosing an exchange rate regime. I earlier noted that the BBC regime that I have 
advocated in the past can be regarded as an attempt to take account of the valid elements 
in all of the three approaches recognized by Max Corden. In the same way, I would 
regard the Development Strategy Approach as a factor that should be taken into account 
in choosing the central rate in a BBC regime (or in choosing a reference rate). The 
situations in which it will call for a different answer to the Real Targets Approach are 
those where there is a strong capital inflow that threatens to make the exchange rate 
uncompetitive. By encouraging a country to limit the capital inflow in such situations, it 
may also make it possible to avoid a subsequent crisis and the highly undervalued 
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